100 lines
6.8 KiB
Plaintext
100 lines
6.8 KiB
Plaintext
What Al-Qaeda wants
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<p><em>(Second in a series.)</em></p>
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<p>In a <a href="http://esr.ibiblio.org/index.php?m=200206#48">The<br />
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Mirage of Moderate Islam</a>, I have described the Koranic roots of<br />
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Islamic fanaticism, and observed that Osama bin Laden’s terror war on<br />
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the west is part of a recurring pattern of fundamentalist revival<br />
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associated with jihad in Islamic history.</p>
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<p>In this essay, I’ll get more specific about what Osama bin Laden is<br />
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really after. In the process, it will become clear why Arab-world<br />
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governments are so frightened of him.</p>
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<p>The first thing to understand is that Osama bin Laden is neither<br />
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crazy nor stupid. He is a very intelligent, educated, visionary man<br />
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who is operating from deep within the Islamic worldview. He’s trying<br />
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to do on a global scale what the Ayatollah Khomeini did in Iran in<br />
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1979; he’s bucking for the job of Caliph of Islam (“Khalifa” in<br />
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Arabic).</p>
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<p>The position of <a href="http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/politics/khalifa.html">Khalifa</a><br />
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has been vacant since the last Padishah Emperor of the Ottoman Empire<br />
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was deposed in 1924, when the British and French broke up the Empire<br />
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after it picked the wrong side in World War One. Before that, the<br />
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Caliph was in theory both the supreme temporal and spiritual ruler<br />
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of the Islamic world.</p>
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<p>I say “in theory” because the Caliph’s actual authority varied<br />
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considerably. In the early centuries of Islam, during the initial<br />
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expansionary phase of the Empire, it was absolute — in European<br />
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terms, as though Charlemagne or Napoleon were also the Pope. It<br />
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tended to decrease over time as the increasing size of the Islamic<br />
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empire led to political fragmentation. Independent emirs swore<br />
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nominal fealty to the Caliph and accepted his symbolic authority<br />
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in religious matters, while otherwise behaving as sovereigns. An<br />
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able Caliph backed by strong armies could buck this disintegrative<br />
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trend and make the allegiance of the emirs more than nominal. Eventually<br />
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emperors of the Ottoman Turks collected this title, and gathered most<br />
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of the Islamic world under their sway. But the Ottoman Empire had been in<br />
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decline for four centuries by 1924, and the title of Caliph had<br />
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become almost meaningless.</p>
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<p>One of the signature traits of Islamic revivalism is nostalgia for<br />
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the halcyon days of Islamic expansion, when the Caliph was the<br />
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undisputed Arm of Allah and there was plenty of plunder and rapine<br />
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to go around as the armies of God smote the infidel and claimed<br />
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new lands for the Dar-al-Islam.</p>
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<p>Here’s where we cue the ominous theme music. It is part of Islamic<br />
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tradition that the title of Khalifa may be attained by conquest if the<br />
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incumbent is not fulfilling his duties — or if there is no incumbent.<br />
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Under shari’a law and hadith, the umma (the consultative assembly of<br />
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the elders of Islam) is <em>required</em> to recognize as Khalifa<br />
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anyone who is able to fulfill the duties of the position and<br />
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demonstrates the sanction of Allah by mobilizing the Dar-al-Islam in<br />
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successful jihad. Jihad, here, is interpreted broadly; a war of<br />
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consolidation that united a substantial portion of the Dar-al-Islam<br />
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under a fundamentalist Islamic theocracy would do it. </p>
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<p>In other words, since 1924 the position of Caliph has been waiting<br />
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for a Man on Horseback. Or, for you science-fiction fans out there, a<br />
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Muad’Dib. The Ayatollah Khomeini could never quite make this nut;<br />
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first, because he was not a plausible warlord, and second because he’s<br />
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part of the 10% Shi’a minority branch that disputes the Khalifal<br />
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succession. The next Caliph, if there is one, will have to belong to<br />
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the 90% Sunni majority.</p>
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<p>Osama bin Laden has behaved precisely as though he intends to fill<br />
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that role. And in doing so, he has frightened the crap out of the<br />
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rulers of the Arab world. Because he’s played his religious and<br />
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propaganda cards very well in Islamic terms, barring the detail that<br />
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he may well be dead and buried under rubble in an Afghan cave.</p>
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<p>On 9/11, bin Laden took jihad to the symbolic heart of the West<br />
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more effectively than any Islamic ruler has managed since the Siege of<br />
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Vienna was broken in 1683. By doing so he caught Arab rulers<br />
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(especially the Saudis) in a neat theo-political trap. They have been<br />
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encouraging hatred of Israel and the West, and hyping the jihadist<br />
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mythology of fundamentalist Islam, as a way of diverting popular anger<br />
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that might otherwise focus on their own corrupt and repressive<br />
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regimes. But Bin Laden has trumped and beaten them at this game. He<br />
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has acted out the Koranic duty of jihad in a way they never dared —<br />
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and in doing so, seized the religious high ground.</p>
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<p>The sheikhs and ayatollahs now have a dilemma. If they support<br />
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jihadism, they must either start a war against the West they know they<br />
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cannot win or cede their own legitimacy to the Caliph-claimant who is<br />
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leading the jihad. But if they come out against jihad, bin Laden or<br />
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his successor can de-legitimitize them simply by pointing to the<br />
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Koran. The possibility that the semi-mythical “Arab street” would<br />
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revolt behind local Khomeini-equivalents hot to join al-Qaeda’s jihad is<br />
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quite real.</p>
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<p>Let the last word go to the mentor of Osama bin Laden, Sheik<br />
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Abdullah Azzam: “Jihad must not be abandoned until Allah alone is<br />
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worshipped by mankind…Jihad and the rifle alone…no negotiations,<br />
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no conferences and no dialogue.” The Palestinians are, as usual,<br />
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disposable pawns in a larger game. The objective of al-Qaeda’s game<br />
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is to follow the Koranic blueprint to its logical conclusion; global<br />
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jihad, a second age of conversion by the sword, the destruction of the<br />
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West, and the establishment of a global Islamic theocracy.</p>
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<p>Osama bin Laden himself may be dead now. Unfortunately, this<br />
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doesn’t necessarily stop the game, because his body hasn’t been found.<br />
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The Twelfth Imam of Shi’a disappeared under mysterious circumstances<br />
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in 941CE; persons claiming to be him and calling the faithful to jihad<br />
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emerged at intervals for a thousand years afterwards, the most recent<br />
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one being the Mahdi who led an anti-British revolt in Egypt in 1899.<br />
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If the jihadist tendency in Islam is not confronted and destroyed,<br />
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Osama bin Laden could haunt the West for a thousand years.</p>
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<p><em>(To be continued…)</em></p>
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<p><a href="http://enetation.co.uk/comments.php?user=esr&commentid=77964879">Blogspot comments</a></p>
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