113 lines
7.7 KiB
Plaintext
113 lines
7.7 KiB
Plaintext
Winning the War Against Terror
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<p><em>(Final essay of the series.)</em></p>
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<p>In previous essays in this series, I have <a href="http://esr.ibiblio.org/index.php?m=200206#48">described<br />
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Islam</a> as a warlike and bloody religion subject to periodic fits of<br />
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violent fundamentalist revival. I have analyzed the roots of Islamic<br />
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terror in the Koranic duty of jihad, and elucidated Osama bin Laden’s<br />
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goal as nothing less than the destruction of the West and the <a href="http://esr.ibiblio.org/index.php?m=200206#6">establishment<br />
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of a global</a> Islamic theocracy. I have analyzed the reason<br />
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Americans have trouble <a href="http://esr.ibiblio.org/index.php?m=200206#51">comprehending<br />
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the scope of the threat</a>, and I have explained why Western-style<br />
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diplomacy is <a href="http://esr.ibiblio.org/index.php?m=200206#22">next<br />
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to useless</a> in this situation. In this final essay I’ll suggest<br />
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paths towards a solution.</p>
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<p>In order to win, we must begin with realism about the scope of the<br />
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war and the objectives of the enemy. We must realize that although in<br />
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theory and theology al-Qaeda is making war on the entire infidel West,<br />
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in practice they are only interested in attacking the U.S., the<br />
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`hyperpower’ that leads it.</p>
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<p>There is no possible gain for al-Qaeda in attacking Europe and<br />
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risking a change in the pro-Arab, pro-Palestinian tilt of the EU<br />
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(which has just resumed support payments to the Palestinian Authority<br />
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despite conclusive evidence that the money is diverted to pay for<br />
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massacres of Israeli children). Nor can al-Qaeda gain any leverage by<br />
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attacks on the remainder of the world. The theaters of the war will<br />
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include the U.S. and terrorist base areas in the Islamic arc<br />
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stretching from Morocco through the Maghreb through the Middle East to<br />
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Pakistan, and perhaps in Indonesia and the Phillipines as well.</p>
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<p>To people who view the entire world through the lens of the Western<br />
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tradition, the strategy I will outline is doubtless going to sound<br />
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bellicose and regressive. It is not; it is founded on a cold-blooded<br />
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realization that Arab cultures (and the Arabized cultures of the rest<br />
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of the Islamic world) regard victory in war as a sign of Allah’s favor<br />
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and regard compromise and concession as a sign of weakness.</p>
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<p>The war against Islamic terror must be fought on three levels:<br />
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homeland defense, military power projection, and cultural subversion.<br />
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We must foil terrorist acts; we must imprison or kill the terrorists<br />
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who plan and execute them; and we must dry up the pool of potential<br />
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recruits before they become terrorists who can only be stopped by<br />
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being imprisoned or killed.</p>
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<p>Homeland defense includes all those measures designed to make the<br />
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attacks on U.S. civilians less likely to succeed. These will include<br />
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conventional police and security measures. It must also include a<br />
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revival of the role of the unincorporated militia and the armed<br />
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citizen. Al-Qaeda has limited resources, but the advantage of<br />
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choosing where they will strike; since the police and military cannot<br />
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be everywhere, civilians (like the passengers of flight 93) must take<br />
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anti-terrorist defense into their own hands.</p>
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<p>Military power projection includes direct military action against<br />
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terrorist bases and havens. As an anarchist, I would prefer a world<br />
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in which private security agencies under contract to insurance<br />
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companies pursued al-Qaeda; persons of some other political persuasions<br />
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might propose supranational agencies such as the U.N. Unfortunately,<br />
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under the current world system there is no alternative to governments<br />
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to do this work. The U.S. has begun it in Afghanistan; the war must<br />
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continue in Iraq, and it is likely to encompass Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi<br />
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Arabia as well.</p>
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<p>The goal of military power projection must be twofold: physical and<br />
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psychological. The physical goal must be to destroy the physical<br />
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infrastructure of terrorism — the headquarters, bases and training<br />
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camps. While this is important, the psychological goal of humiliating<br />
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and crushing jihadists is even more important.</p>
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<p>Islamic armies and resistance movements are fanatical in attack but<br />
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brittle on the defense. When motivated by the conviction that Allah<br />
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guides their arm, suicidal bravery is routine.<br />
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On the other hand, when the fortunes of a cause decline past a<br />
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certain point, Arabs tend to consider the will of Allah to be manifest<br />
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and abruptly abandon it. These tendencies form part of the cultural<br />
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background that includes even secularized terrorist movements<br />
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(such as Yasser Arafat’s al-Fatah) in the Islamic world.</p>
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<p>The U.S. was able to exploit this brittleness effectively in<br />
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Afghanistan. By moving in overwhelming force when it moved at all,<br />
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the U.S. was able to intimidate many warlords affiliated with the<br />
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Taliban into switching sides — an important reason the campaign<br />
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involved so little actual fighting.</p>
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<p>We must repeat this maneuver on a larger scale. We must teach the<br />
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Dar-al-Islam to respect and <em>fear</em> the power of the West. We<br />
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must not negotiate or offer concessions until it is clear from the<br />
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behavior of governments, the umma, and the “Arab street” that the<br />
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public will to support jihad has been broken.</p>
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<p>Our most important long-term weapon against Islamic terrorism,<br />
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however, will be cultural subversion. That is, to break the hold of<br />
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the Islamist/jihadist idea on the minds of Muslims. To do this, it<br />
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may be necessary to discredit the entirety of Islam; the question<br />
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depends on whether any Islamic figure will be clever enough to<br />
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construct an interpretation of Islam purged of jihadist tendencies,<br />
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and whether that version can propagate and displace the<br />
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Sunni-fundamentalist varieties now dominant in the Islamic world.</p>
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<p>I can do no better than to quote Michelle Efird, the woman who<br />
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inspired my essay<br />
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<a href="http://esr.ibiblio.org/index.php?m=200206#5">We Are All Jews Now</a>. In private mail afterwards<br />
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(quoted with permission) she wrote:</p>
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<blockquote><p>
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I don’t want to appease them, I don’t want to understand them, I<br />
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don’t want to let them reap the benefits of our liberalism while<br />
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plotting our destruction. Like most Americans, I would have been more<br />
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than happy to let them pretend the last 400 years of progress never<br />
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happened, as long as they didn’t force their warped-vision goggles on<br />
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anyone else. But since they brought the war to us, let’s pave the<br />
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middle east with outlet malls, fast food franchises, and Disney<br />
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Mecca. Let’s infect their entire population with personal liberty and<br />
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dissension and critical thinking. And if that doesn’t work, let’s<br />
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flood them with porn spam.
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</p></blockquote>
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<p>Osama bin Laden may, in the end, have materialized his own worst<br />
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fears. The ideology of jihad has created its mirror and opposite; the<br />
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dawning sense that we in the West have the right, the power, and the<br />
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<em>duty</em> to wipe bin Laden’s brand of religion from the face of<br />
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the earth before it destroys us all.</p>
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<p>UPDATE: N.Z. Bear has written an<br />
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<a href="http://www.truthlaidbear.com/001188.html#001188"><br />
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excellent essay</a> on memes and cultural subversion.</p>
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<p><a href="http://enetation.co.uk/comments.php?user=esr&commentid=78500864">Blogspot comments</a></p>
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